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One of our least memorable Presidents put it most memorably:
"The business of America," said Calvin Coolidge, "is business."
Coolidge and others believed that so long as industry chugged
along and government kept its cautious distance, twentieth century
America would have more goods, more jobs, and a higher standard
of living. The corporate form was one mechanism for this growth.
It offered centralized management, the ability to sell stock to raise
capital, and limited liability for investors and directors. Today,
America sits (albeit shakily) atop the economic world, and corpora-
tions account for nearly 90% of the country's business receipts.,
During this growth period, a central principle of corporate law
emerged and proved virtually unassailable: the sole duty of a corpo-
ration's officers (subject to certain limited obligations) was to maxi-
mize shareholder wealth. When no less a business legend than
Henry Ford challenged this doctrine, even he was rebuffed. 2
By the late 1960s, corporate officers faced greater constraints.
Legislation like the Consumer Product Safety Act, 3 the Clean Air
Act,4 the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 5 and the Fed-
eral Trade Commission Act 6 limited the untrammeled pursuit of
shareholder profits. At the same time, calls arose for corporations
to become more "socially responsible." Discussion began about
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 532 (1984).
2. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). Ford wanted to withhold
certain special dividends of the Ford Motor Company in order to cut the price of Ford
cars to allow more Americans to purchase automobiles. At the time, the company was
already selling more cars than it could produce. A group of minority shareholders sued
to compel payment of the dividends. The court held that Ford's duty was to these share-
holders-not to American car buyers. "A business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end." Id. at 684.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 2051-2083 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 7401-7642 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
6. 15 U.S.C. § 2051-2083 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
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whether corporations had obligations to their workers, the commu-
nity, and the environment. 7 Shareholders waged proxy fights to
stop Dow Chemical Company from making napalm, 8 and sued to
inspect corporate records in an effort to halt Honeywell Inc.'s manu-
facture of anti-personnel fragmentation bombs. 9 Although the de-
bate was sometimes vitriolic,' 0 social responsibility became part of
corporate law jurisprudence and standard fare on the menu of most
law school corporations courses.
Still, the principle that a corporate officer's overriding duty was to
maximize shareholder wealth remained intact. President Coolidge's
adage even acquired a modern day counterpart: "What's good for
General Motors (and its shareholders) is good for America."
The Rev. Leon Sullivan thought he knew what was good for Gen-
eral Motors. A Baptist minister and community activist in Philadel-
phia, Sullivan was also a GM board member. In 1971 he publicly
dissented from his fellow directors and endorsed a shareholder res-
olution demanding that the company withdraw from South Africa.
The resolution lost resoundingly. A few years later Sullivan
changed tactics and gave corporate social responsibility a new cast.
He devised a code of conduct for American corporations doing
business in South Africa. Soon known as the Sullivan Principles, the
code called for integrated workplaces, fair employment practices,
and affirmative action. Companies voluntarily signed on, and their
compliance was rated by independent auditors. In 1984, with about
125 signatories, Sullivan amplified the code to require companies to
take more affirmative steps to end apartheid. By 1987, however,
Sullivan decided his efforts to use corporate power to effect social
change were futile; he abandoned his Principles and urged U.S.
companies to leave South Africa.
Nonetheless, the Sullivan Principles retained some appeal for
those concerned with social responsibility. In September 1989, a
coalition of environmental groups and social investors used the Sul-
livan Principles as a model for a new code of corporate environmental
7. See, e.g., N. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (1973); R. NA-
DER, M. GREEN, & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION (1976); C. STONE,
WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).
8. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated
as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
9. State ex. rel Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 191 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. 1971).
10. "Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to
make as much money for their stockholders as possible. This is a fundamentally subver-
sive doctrine." M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
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conduct. Called the Valdez Principles to memorialize last year's
massive Alaskan oil spill," the code calls on companies to protect
the biosphere, use renewable resources, dispose of waste properly,
disclose environmental risks, and submit to an annual environmen-
tal audit. 12
This Current Topic will examine the Valdez Principles. Section I
will trace the history and development of their model, the Sullivan
Principles. Section II will introduce the Valdez Principles and their
specific provisions. Section III will explore the similarities and dif-
ferences between the two codes in an effort to illuminate the Valdez
Principles' prospects. Section IV will assess these prospects and
suggest changes and improvements in the code. The Current Topic
ultimately will argue that the Valdez Principles are part of a trend
toward extra-legal, market-driven enforcement of corporate social
responsibility, and that to succeed they must exploit market forces
and appeal directly to companies' economic self-interests.
L The Sullivan Principles
Thwarted in his 1971 efforts to persuade fellow board members
that General Motors should withdraw from South Africa, the Rev.
Sullivan chose a new tack. Sullivan believed that if his and other
companies were not going to leave South Africa, they should at least
challenge apartheid. In 1977 he drew up his now famous list to
serve that end. The original Sullivan Principles were:
I. Nonsegregation of the races in all eating, comfort, locker room,
and work facilities.
II. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees.
III. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for
the same period of time.
IV. Initiation and development of training programs that will pre-
pare blacks, coloreds and Asians in substantial numbers for su-
pervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs.
V. Increasing the number of blacks, coloreds and Asians in manage-
ment and supervisory positions.
11. The Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran aground, spilling more than ten million gallons of
oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound. The several-month $1.2 billion clean up effort
still left vast amounts of oil in the water. See Shabecoff, Largest U.S. Tanker Spill Spews
270,000 Barrels of Oil Off Alaska, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1989, at AI, col. 2.
12. See infra text accompanying note 31. See also 16 NEWS FOR INVESTORS 178, 180-
181 (1989) (published by the Investor Responsibility Research Center); Feder, Who Will




VI. Improving the quality of employees' lives outside the work envi-
ronment, including schooling, recreation and health facilities.
13
Only twelve companies (including General Motors) agreed to the
Principles that year, but by 1982 some 147 companies-represent-
ing about 80% of U.S.-employed South Africans-had become sig-
natories. 14 That figure fluctuated in subsequent years, but included
corporate titans like Exxon, IBM, Citicorp, and Mobil.
Companies that became signatories paid yearly dues of between
$1,000 and $7,000 to take part in the program. Sullivan administra-
tors periodically sent them detailed questionnaires requesting infor-
mation about hiring practices, promotion policies, investment in the
community, and other matters. These reports were inspected by
outside auditors, and then evaluated and rated by Arthur D. Little
Inc., a Cambridge, Massachusetts consulting firm. Little gave com-
panies one of three grades: (I) Making good progress; (II) Making
progress; (III-A) Needs to become more active/received low point
rating; (III-B) Needs to become more active/did not meet basic re-
quirements. While no direct penalty was leveled against companies
with low grades, the results were publicized and companies were
forced to pay a public relations price.' 5
By late 1984, Rev. Sullivan had become dissatisfied with the pro-
gress. Although 128 of about 350 American companies operating in
South Africa had signed the Sullivan Principles,' 6 apartheid had not
loosened its grip on the country; crackdowns escalated, and in the
U.S. activists, students, and Congressional representatives called for
sanctions and divestment. In response, Sullivan amplified the code
by adding four, more affirmatively political, provisions to Principle
VI. These additions called on companies to engage in a form of
corporate civil disobedience, to advance these new Principles even if
it meant engaging in conduct illegal under South African law. The
provisions, titled "Increased Dimensions of Activities Outside the
Workplace," stated:
- Use influence and support the unrestricted rights of black busi-
nesses to locate in urban areas of the nation.
13. Weedon, The Evolution of Sullivan Principle Compliance, Bus & Soc'y REV., Spring
1986, at 57.
14. McManus, Being There, FORBES, Nov. 8, 1982, at 218.
15. For a more detailed explanation of Sullivan procedures, see Weedon, supra note
13, at 56.
16. U.S. Companies Bolster Anti-Apartheid Code, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1984, at D 1, col. 1.
While this figure does represent more than one-third of American companies, these
companies employed only about one percent of the South African labor force.
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- Influence other companies in South Africa to follow the standards
of equal rights principles.
- Support the freedom of mobility of black workers to seek employ-
ment opportunities wherever they exist, and make possible provi-
sions for adequate housing for families of employees within
proximity of workers' employment.
- Support the ending of all apartheid laws.
17
As conditions worsened in South Africa and even the expanded
Sullivan Principles seemed to have little effect, Sullivan issued an
ultimatum. In May 1985 he announced that if in twenty-four
months apartheid was not abolished and blacks awarded full social
and political rights, he would call for a total economic embargo on
South Africa and the withdrawal of all American companies.
Although the Sullivan Principles were not effective in eradicating
apartheid, they had another impact in the United States. University
endowments and state and city pension funds began using adher-
ence to the Principles as a factor in their investments. Brown and
Yale Universities, for instance, both voted to divest themselves of
stock in companies whose South African operations did not comply
with the Sullivan Principles.' 8 Connecticut and Iowa likewise lim-
ited investments of their state employee pension funds to compa-
nies rated in the top two categories of Sullivan compliance.' 9 The
city of New York had a similar policy for its massive $17 billion pen-
sion fund.20 By 1987 pension funds of five states, nine cities, and
fifty-nine universities used the Sullivan Principles as a benchmark
for their investments. 2 ' Not to be outdone, President Reagan issued
an executive order that included the requirement that American
companies in South Africa abide by Sullivan standards. 22
Still, apartheid did not budge, and Sullivan's self-imposed dead-
line drew closer. In late 1986, fifteen years after Sullivan first made
17. Id.
18. Yale to Divest Some Holdings, N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1986, at B6, col. 1; Brown Univer-
sity Approves South African Stock Policy, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 1984, Sec. 1, at 37, col. 6.
19. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-13f (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 12A.1-.5 (West 1989). The
Connecticut statute also requires that companies not supply strategic products to the
South African government and police, and that they permit employees to organize and
strike.
20. Telephone interview with Jon Lukomnik, press secretary for the New York City
Comptroller's Office (Dec. 8, 1989).
21. New Sullivan Principles, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1987, § 4, at 2, col. 4.




his appeal to the board, General Motors announced it would with-
draw from South Africa; I.B.M. followed suit the next day.2 3 Be-
tween 1986 and mid-1987, more than 100 other American
companies also sold off their South African subsidiaries.2 4 Finally,
on June 4, 1987, Sullivan called a Washington news conference. He
declared that the Sullivan Principles had failed to dismantle
apartheid, and the only alternative was for companies to cut all com-
mercial links to South Africa. He also called for a U.S. economic
embargo of South Africa and for the Reagan Administration to
sever diplomatic ties with the nation. At the time of the announce-
ment, 127 companies subscribed to the Sullivan Principles.
Although Sullivan said "they kept the Ten Commandments without
Moses," the Sullivan Principles have become far less potent without
him.2 5 Today only about 60 companies subscribe to what is now
called the Statement of Principles. Many companies have withdrawn
from South Africa, and corporate responsibility in South Africa has
received scant media attention.
Nonetheless, the ten-year experiment with the Sullivan Principles
did yield some success: it established a new standard for investment
decisions by many pension funds, improved the quality of life for
many black South Africans working for American companies,
brought the issues of South Africa to a wider array of the American
population, and added to the voices calling for reform. As for the
primary goal, however-dismantling apartheid-the Sullivan Princi-
ples were sadly ineffective. As one major newspaper editorialized,
"With an ally like constructive engagement, the Sullivan approach
stood vulnerable and alone." 26
23. Feder, I.B.M. is Shedding South Africa Unit; Pressure is Cited, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22,
1986, at Al, col. 4; Divestment Ends a 5-Year Struggle, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1986, at D30,
col. 5. I.B.M., like many companies, did not endorse the Sullivan Principles' 1984 ampli-
fication. As company chairman John F. Akers put it, "We are not in business to conduct
moral activity, we are not in business to conduct socially responsible action. We are in
business to conduct business." Id. at 30.
24. Feder, Apartheid Deadline Troubles Sullivan, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1987, at D3, col. 1.
25. Smith, Commandments Without Moses; Abandoning His Principles, Sullivan Wants U.S.
Firms to Pull Out, TIME, June 15, 1987, at 34.
26. Ending Real Constructive Engagement, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1987, at A18, col. 1.
Constructive engagement, the name of the Reagan Administration's policy towards
South Africa, eschewed sanctions and other harsh measures in favor of U.S. participa-
tion in the South African economy. See Crocker, Reagan Administration's African Policy: A
Progress Report, DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 1984, at 38. Critics contended not only that the
policy was ineffective, but that American participation lent the white minority regime
undeserved moral credibility.
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II. The Valdez Principles
The Sullivan Principles also produced another, longer term, re-
sult: they pioneered a new social responsibility strategy. Irish activ-
ists, for example, used them as a model for the MacBride Principles,
named for Sean MacBride, an Irish human rights activist and Nobel
Peace Prize winner. The MacBride Principles attempted to use
American companies operating in Northern Ireland to combat dis-
crimination against Catholic workers.27 The MacBride Principles
have not achieved the notoriety of the Sullivan Principles, in part
because of a potential conflict with British law.28 Although the Mac-
Bride Principles still exist, they have no signatories.
More recently the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible
Economies (CERES)-a group of socially-responsible investors and
national environmental organizations 2 9 -proposed another Sulli-
van-style code of corporate conduct. Called the Valdez Principles,
the code focuses on the environment. "Our intent," the coalition
explains, "is to create a voluntary mechanism of corporate self-
governance that will maintain business practices consistent with the
goals of sustaining our fragile environment for future generations,
within a culture that respects all life and honors its
independence."-3
0
The Valdez Principles urge companies to abide by the following
code:
1. PROTECTION OF THE BIOSPHERE
We will minimize and strive to eliminate the release of any pollutant
that may cause environmental damage to the air, water, or earth or its
inhabitants. We will safeguard habitats in rivers, lakes, wetlands,
27. Lohr, Push on Hiring Bias in Ulster, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1986, at Dl, col. 3. The
MacBride Principles call for equal access to regional employment and certain equal op-
portunity and affirmative action programs for Northern Ireland. Specifically, the Princi-
ples call for increasing the representation of underrepresented religious groups in the
work force, protection of minority employees, training and recruitment programs for
minority employees, banning provocative religious symbols from the workplace, and un-
biased layoff, recall, and termination procedures. Id.
28. Many American companies did not sign the MacBride Principles because they
feared certain affirmative action steps would be construed as "reverse discrimination"
under Britain's Fair Employment Act of 1976. In New York City Employees' Retirement
System v. American Brands, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), involving a share-
holder's action against a company, a district court later clarified the issue. The court
held that the MacBride Principles did not violate the British statute and therefore that
they were appropriate material for a shareholder's resolution in proxy materials.
29. These groups include the National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Fed-
eration, the Wilderness Society, Calvert Social Investment Fund & Foundation, New
York State Controller's Office, and Working Assets.
30. The Social Investment Forum, C.E.R.E.S. Project, Valdez Principles Statement




coastal zones and oceans and will minimize contributing to the green-
house effect, depletion of the ozone layer, acid rain, or smog.
2. SUSTAINABLE USE OF NATURAL RESOURCES
We will make sustainable use of renewable resources, such as water,
soils and forests. We will conserve nonrenewable natural resources
through efficient use and careful planning. We will protect wildlife
habitat, open spaces and wilderness while preserving biodiversity.
3. REDUCTION AND DISPOSAL OF WASTE
We will minimize the creation of waste, especially hazardous waste,
and wherever possible recycle materials. We will dispose of all wastes
through safe and responsible methods.
4. WISE USE OF ENERGY
We will make every effort to use environmentally safe and sustaina-
ble energy sources to meet our needs. We will invest in improved en-
ergy efficiency and conservation in our operations. We will maximize
the energy efficiency of products we produce or sell.
5. RISK REDUCTION
We will minimize the environmental, health and safety risks to our
employees and the communities in which we operate by employing
safe technologies and operating procedures and by being constantly
prepared for emergencies.
6. MARKETING OF SAFE PiODUCTS AND SERVICES
We will sell products or services that minimize adverse environmen-
tal impacts and that are safe as consumers commonly use them. We
will inform consumers of the environmental impacts of our products
and services.
7. DAMAGE COMPENSATION
We will take responsibility for any harm we cause to the environ-
ment by making every effort to fully restore the environment and to
compensate those persons who are adversely affected.
8. DISCLOSURE
We will disclose to our employees and to the public incidents relat-
ing to our operations that cause environmental harm or pose safety or
health hazards. We will disclose potential environmental, health, or
safety hazards posed by our operations, and we will not take any action
against employees who report any condition that creates a danger to
the environment or poses health and safety hazards.
9. ENVIRONMENTAL DIRECTORS AND MANAGERS
At least one member of the Board of Directors will be a person qual-
ified to represent environmental interests. We will commit manage-
ment resources to implement these Principles, including the funding
of an office of vice president for environmental affairs or an equivalent
executive position, reporting directly to the CEO, to monitor and re-
port upon our implementation efforts.
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10. ASSESSMENT AND ANNUAL AUDIT
We will conduct and make public an annual self-evaluation of our
progress in implementing these Principles and in complying with all
applicable laws and regulations throughout our worldwide operations.
We will work toward the timely creation of independent environmen-
tal audit procedures which we will complete annually and make avail-
able to the public.
3 1
The Valdez Principles are not fixed; they are a "long term process
rather than a static statement." 32 Organizers will be working to
elaborate and specify the provisions as part of "a long term program
to divert capital toward environmental health and away from abusive
practices." 33 Their goal is to establish the Valdez Principles as a
touchstone for investment decisions by pension funds, individual in-
vestors, religious portfolios, and college endowments. In addition,
they hope to incorporate the Valdez Principles in shareholder reso-
lutions and consumer actions. Earth Day 1990 organizers also made
the Valdez Principles a centerpiece of their efforts.
3 4
III. How the Valdez Principles and the Sullivan Principles Compare
In many respects the Sullivan Principles and the Valdez Principles
are similar. Both codes are non-legal and non-governmental. Both
seek voluntary compliance from industry. Both involve monitoring,
evaluating, and publicizing corporate behavior. Valdez organizers
used the Sullivan Principles - the first such corporate code of con-
duct - as their model. Yet the two codes differ in important ways,
and these differences illuminate the strengths and weaknesses, the
prospects and possibilities, of the Valdez Principles.
Unlike the Sullivan Principles, for instance, the Valdez Principles
are not linked to a single individual. Leon Sullivan was the driving
force behind his code, working for a decade to sign up companies,
revamp the Principles, and publicize his efforts. As an African-
American, a clergyman, a civil rights activist, and a board member of
one of America's largest companies, he was uniquely suited to bring
31. The Social Investment Forum, C.E.R.E.S. Project, Valdez Principles [hereinafter
Valdez Principles].
32. Valdez Principles Statement of Intent, supra note 30.
33. Joan Bavaria, Opening Remarks, News Conference on the Release of the Valdez
Principles (Sept. 7, 1989).
34. See Feder, The Business of Earth Day, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12, 1989, Sec. 3, at 4, col. 3.
Earth Day 1990 celebrates the twentieth anniversary of Earth Day, a 1970 nationwide





corporate pressure to bear on apartheid. Sullivan's individual ef-
forts, along with the focused media and organizational attention
they generated, gave the Sullivan Principles an energy they might
have otherwise lacked. When Sullivan abandoned the code, how-
ever, the Principles that took his name lost their impact. The Valdez
Principles, by contrast, have many creators. On the one hand, this
could lead to organizational difficulties, conflicting goals, and a dif-
fusion of voices. On the other hand, having many participants al-
lows greater input and, more importantly, ensures that the success
of the code does not hinge on any single person or group.
The codes are also distinguished by the location of the affected
corporations' business interests. The Sullivan Principles applied to
American companies operating overseas. The Valdez Principles
concentrate primarily on domestic operations. As a result, companies
who sign on to the Valdez Principles could receive greater scrutiny
from American groups and the American media - scrutiny that
could deter them from participating. In a sense, South Africa insu-
lated Sullivan signatories from public attention. Not only was the
country half a globe away, but its state-imposed press restrictions
were so severe that information barely trickled into the U.S.
Likewise, the climates in which the companies operate, along with
the ensuing outside pressures, also differ widely. The social condi-
tions in South Africa were, and remain, brutal and intractable. Con-
sequently, many Americans asserted there was only one appropriate
response: complete withdrawal of U.S. companies. With total di-
vestment as the other option, signing the Sullivan Principles was an
acceptable alternative for many corporations. Critics contended
that companies used the Sullivan Principles as camouflage-as ajus-
tification for operating in (and profiting from) a fundamentally cor-
rupt and odious system.3 5 Finally, Congressional sanctions often
loomed in the background for Sullivan companies. 36 Since these
sanctions threatened to disrupt their ability to do business, many
companies signed the Sullivan Principles to quell legislative action.
35. In addition, some companies who were Sullivan signatories also lobbied vigor-
ously against divestment. See Parks, Push Reforms or Show a Profit?. U.S. Firms in South
Africa Under Growing Pressure, L.A. Times, Aug. 10, 1986, at 1, col. 5. See also U.S. Firms
Asked to Accept Strengthened Code for Doing Business in South Africa, Christian Science Monitor,
Dec. 13, 1984, at 1.
36. See Walsh, Lugar to Urge New S. Africa Sanctions, Wash. Post, Jul. 29, 1986, at A l;
Moffett, U.S. Lawmakers Propose Sanctions Against South Africa, Christian Science Monitor,
Mar. 8, 1985, at 1; Omang, Conferees Approve Economic Sanctions Against South Africa; Action
Repudiates White House Policy, Wash. Post, Aug. 1, 1985, at Al.
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By contrast, no such outside pressures exist for the Valdez Princi-
ples. While there have been calls-particularly community-based
ones-for companies to step up their environmental efforts, nothing
analogous to complete withdrawal has been proposed. The absence
of this stark alternative removes an incentive for companies to en-
dorse the code. Nor does new legislation give Valdez companies the
same impetus it gave their Sullivan predecessors. 37 Although in-
creased environmental regulation has been proposed, 38 the propos-
als are not so severe that they automatically would drive companies
to sign the Valdez Principles. Indeed, depending on the specific
standards established, some Valdez provisions-particularly regard-
ing environmental audits, energy efficiency, and environmental ex-
perts on corporate boards-could be even more demanding than
legislation.
Outside pressures relate to another key difference between the
codes. The Sullivan Principles were designed to use American cor-
porations to change a situation they did not create. The Valdez
Principles, by contrast, address conditions these companies had a
role in creating.3 9 In other words, the Valdez Principles-in con-
trast to the Sullivan Principles-are not a means to some other end.
They are a direct effort to solve and avert a particular set of
problems. Some corporations might be averse to signing the Valdez
Principles if it means tacitly acknowledging that they contributed to
the conditions the code seeks to correct.
Perhaps most important, however, are the differences between the
actual provisions of the two codes. Specifically, the Valdez Princi-
ples are more demanding than the Sullivan code in at least three
ways. First, the original six Sullivan Principles40 concern integra-
tion, fair labor practices, and limited affirmative action-steps com-
panies had already taken in the U.S. The Valdez Principles,
however, demand more drastic action: changing board members,
disclosing all potential hazards, and submitting to a public audit.
Stiffer requirements could make companies averse to signing the en-
vironmental code. Second, the Valdez Principles reach much more
37. In contrast to the South African situation, American companies already function
within certain legislatively imposed environmental limits. See supra note 4 & 5.
38. The Bush Administration, for example, has offered amendments to the Clean Air
Act. See H.R. 4, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).
39. For example, manufacturers of chlorofluorocarbons played a role in the deterio-
ration of the biosphere. Some companies have created problems by improperly dispos-
ing of toxic waste. And Exxon did, after all, spill thousands of barrels of oil into Prince
William Sound.




of an individual corporation's business. Most American companies
had only a fraction of their operations in South Africa. Thus, the
overall economic costs of complying with the Sullivan Code-espe-
cially with the offsetting public relations gains-were small. Nearly
all companies, however, interact with the environment, and for
many, including most manufacturing companies, that connection is
central to their business. As a result, the economic costs of comply-
ing with the Valdez Principles will likely be greater. Third, the
Valdez Principles would affect more corporations. Because only
some American companies operated in South Africa, the Sullivan
Principles did not affect a substantial portion of the corporate popu-
lation. The Valdez Principles, however, are so broad they could ap-
ply to virtually all domestic corporations.4 '
Taken together, these differences do not bode well for the Valdez
Principles. The environmental code subjects signers to great scru-
tiny, but in the absence of outside forces that prompted many Sulli-
van signatories. In addition, signing the code might be seen as a
tacit admission of fault; Sullivan signers appeared more noble, using
their influence although they had not created the problem. Most
important, the Valdez Principles demand more far reaching efforts
than their model. They also affect more corporations and more of
each individual corporation's business. As a result, the Valdez Prin-
ciples appear to face significant obstacles to becoming a force in cor-
porate responsibility. They seem less likely to obtain signatories
than the Sullivan Principles, which themselves achieved only mixed
results in effecting change.
IV Conclusions and Recommendations
The prospects for the Valdez Principles, however, are not entirely
bleak. What makes them problematic also makes them potentially
promising and powerful. The Valdez Principles' success will hinge
largely on their organizers' ability to recognize this promise and
shape the Principles and their strategies towards this end. In taking
these steps they would do well to recall the lessons of Isaiah Berlin,
the English social philosopher. One of Berlin's most famous works
concerns the fox and the hedgehog. The difference between the
two, he said, was that the fox knew many little things, but the
41. Moreover, American companies never accounted for more than a few per cent of
South Africa's Gross National Product, and often did not supply critical products. In
contrast, the Valdez Principles have the potential to affect a huge portion of the Ameri-
can economy.
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hedgehog knew the one big thing.4 2 Although the Valdez or-
ganizers must concentrate on details like establishing specific stan-
dards, they should not lose sight of an overarching principle.
The hedgehog in this case is the free market. The Valdez Princi-
ples will succeed only by harnessing the power of the marketplace
and becoming fundamental to the way companies do business. The
Valdez Principles, in other words, must affect competitive advan-
tage. They can wield a stick: persuading pension, endowment, and
investment funds to sell stock in nonsignatories and direct capital to
competitors. Or they can offer a carrot: making adherence to the
Principles a way to increase market share. In many industries, a tiny
increase in market share can mean millions of dollars. If whether a
manufacturer has signed the Valdez Principles becomes relevant-
along with factors like price, quality, and packaging-when a con-
sumer makes her decision to purchase, companies will be quick to
sign. 43 The crucial idea is that the Valdez Principles cannot exist as
merely a lofty set of aspirations, but must go directly and forcefully
to a corporation's primary interest-the bottom line. Only by tap-
ping into the force of capitalism, and appealing to (or threatening) a
corporation's economic self-interest can the Valdez Principles stir
the corporate social responsibility they desire.
44
This strategy is neither cynical nor impure. In fact, it squares well
with an emerging trend in social and consumer activism. In the
1960s and 1970s the battle for corporate social responsibility was
waged primarily in the courts and the legislatures. The movement
scored many victories, and the changes it wrought became institu-
tionalized. Abiding by environmental and product safety regula-
tions became part of the day to day operation of American business.
This institutionalization was eventually accompanied by two other
factors: complacency brought on by success and a shift in national
mood.
The 1980s were a decade of deregulation and distrust of govern-
ment. At the same time, many public interest groups perceived
42. I. BERLIN, THE HEDGEHOG AND THE Fox (1953). The book is an exploration of
Tolstoy's view of inexorable historical forces, though its lessons have been applied in
many contexts.
43. See S. LYDENBURG, A. MARLIN, & S. STRUB, RATING AMERICA'S CORPORATE CON-
SCIENCE (1986) [hereinafter RATING AMERICA'S CORPORATE CONSCIENCE].
44. Professor Engel would take issue with this point. His view is that anything in the
long run economic interests of a corporation and its shareholders is not true social re-
sponsibility. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 9
(1979). Dean Clark, on the other hand, refers to a watered down version of this view-




Congress as inefficient and courts as unfriendly. As a result, groups
now seek extra-legal means to promote corporate social responsibil-
ity. Socially responsible investing, for instance, has boomed. Many
mutual funds, along with state, city, and labor pension funds, are
designed specifically to screen investments for social as well as eco-
nomic factors. At least $4.8 billion of individual (not to mention
pension fund) assets are now invested on social criteria.45 Con-
sumer co-operatives and other group buying efforts have also in-
creased in popularity. 46 Ralph Nader has asserted that such
"banding together" represents the next phase in the consumer
movement, one "grounded in philosophy and a mass commitment
to working at and perfecting the consumption function as a shaper of
political economies." 47 Another group has published a guide to
promote social responsibility in the supermarket. 48 The guide lists
various consumer products and rates their manufacturer on several
social criteria, including charitable contributions, women and mi-
nority directors, social disclosure, involvement in South Africa, and
weapons contracts. The consumer can then select Prego Spaghetti
Sauce over Progresso, for example, because Prego's manufacturer
has several women board members and no involvement in South
Africa, while Progresso's builds conventional weapons. 49 The
Valdez Principles are part of this broader trend of using extra-legal
means to encourage corporate social responsibility. Yet the Princi-
ples will flourish only to the extent organizers recognize what others
have already discovered: there is a power to capitalism that can be
harnessed to serve socially responsible ends.50
The fox to this hedgehog is the set of specific steps the Valdez
drafters can implement to make their code work. As for strategy, a
wise first step would be to enlist a few major signatories. When Leon
45. Bavaria, Business Clean Up Your Environmental Act!, Newsday, Sept. 7, 1989, at 37,
col. 2.
46. Examples include New York's Citizens Alliance Fuel Buyers Group, the Buyers
Up group buying efforts (in five cities), and Co-Op America, a national organization that
encourages consumer co-operatives across the nation. See Wald, Fuel Oil Co-ops Stirring a
Debate, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1988, at 42, col. 1; Rosenfeld, Crusading Catalogues Offer Ac-
ceptable Goodies for the Guilty, L.A. Times, Dec. 19, 1986, Part 5, at 2, col. 6.
47. Nader, The Consumer Movement Looks Ahead, in RALPH NADER TASK FORCE ON Eu-
ROPEAN COOPERATIVES, MAKING CHANGE? LEARNING FROM EUROPE'S CONSUMER COOPER-
ATIVES 254 (1985).
48. RATING AMERICA'S CORPORATE CONSCIENCE, supra note 43.
49. Id. at 77.
50. CERES co-chair Denis Hayes put it well, if somewhat anti-climactically: "Our
goal is to make compliance with the Valdez Principles an inherent part of doing busi-
ness. Environmental irresponsibility is bad for the planet. It is also bad for business."
Anderson, Religion in America: Churches Push Environmental Principles on Business, United
Press International, Sept. 29, 1989.
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Sullivan announced his Principles in 1977, representatives of Ford,
Exxon, Xerox, and I.B.M. joined him on the platform. If Valdez or-
ganizers take similar steps, they will acquire increased credibility
and begin to employ the Principles as a competitive tool. Corpora-
tions, notoriously risk averse, will be more likely to act if other mem-
bers of their flock have already done so.
Second, organizers should use the leverage of the pension funds, a strat-
egy whose power is already evident. In April, 1989, New York City
Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin, who oversaw the city's pension
fund, said that if Exxon did not take responsibility for its oil spill
and expedite clean up efforts, he would cast the fund's six million
votes against management at an upcoming Exxon annual meeting.
The company acquiesced. Goldin also won the appointment of a
marine scientist to Exxon's board, 5' a goal announced in the ninth
Valdez Principle. 52 He and California State Controller Gray Davis
have also called on "six major oil and chemical companies to name a
director with significant environmental expertise and to establish an
internal structure to more closely monitor these issues." 53
Although some pension funds are already participating, 54 adding
more will only increase the Principles' potency.
Third, organizers should use environmental problems and events to chal-
lenge companies to participate. At each oil spill or toxic hazard that
makes news, organizers should publicly challenge the involved cor-
poration to sign the Principles. With public attention focused on
the company's failure, corporate officers would be hard pressed to
refuse to sign a public-spirited pledge.
The Principles themselves also leave room for refinement. Be-
cause the code is so broadly worded, the coalition must concentrate
on establishing specific standards by which corporations must abide.
An appropriate first step is to set measurable goals, preferably with indus-
try input. Many of the Principles have no meaning without these spe-
cific benchmarks. For example, in the Principle that calls on
companies "to minimize and strive to eliminate the release of any
pollutant that may cause environmental damage," 55 organizers
51. Parker, Oil Spill Rallies Funds; 3 Seek Support for Environmental Code, Pensions and
Investment Age, Sept. 18, 1989, at 3.
52. See supra text accompanying note 31.
53. Statement by California Controller Gray Davis (Sept. 7, 1989). Such monitoring
is called for in the tenth Valdez Principle.
54. The pension funds are the New York City Retirement Systems ($35.5 billion),
the California Public Employees Retirement System ($24.7 billion), and the California
Teachers' Retirement System. Parker, supra note 51, at 3.




should establish a clearly measurable goal-perhaps cutting
chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) use in half by 1995.56 On Principle 3,
reduction and disposal of waste, the standard might be to recycle
50% of recyclable materials in the next two years. 57 Without these
specific, measurable standards the Valdez Principles will have little
meaning or impact. Industry input in establishing standards will
foster a spirit of cooperation that will encourage future support.
In addition, these measurable goals should also be attainable. Corpora-
tions will not sign a code whose standards are too stiff. By establish-
ing reasonable benchmarks first, organizers can recruit more
companies. Once the companies are on board, organizers can grad-
ually increase the stringency of the standards. Most companies will
be reluctant to abandon the code once they have publicly signed.
That reluctance will give organizers an opportunity to make the
standards gradually more rigorous. In establishing standards
Valdez organizers must keep in mind an important caveat: the initial
standards must be lenient enough to attract signers, but rigorous
enough both to carry out the environmental goals and to be used
for competitive advantage.
Finally, the organizers must set up a simple yet effective administrative
structure. The best method is probably to require some fee for com-
panies to become signatories and then to contract auditing and
compliance monitoring to an independent entity.58 The goal should
be to minimize paperwork and other obstacles while still monitor-
ing, enforcing, and publicizing the Principles.
If organizers can harness the power of free markets, while using
tact and precision in crafting the code's standards, the Valdez Prin-
ciples may be an idea whose time has come. Indeed, the code could
turn a modern business aphorism on its head. The Valdez Princi-
ples will succeed if their supporters can determine what's good for
America, and then persuade General Motors, that it's good for
them, too.
56. See e.g., Holusha, Ozone Issue: Economics of a Ban, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1990, at D 1,
col. 3 (reporting that several Western nations are already taking steps to reduce indus-
trial CFC emissions).
57. See Holusha, McDonald's Acts to Recycle Plastic, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1989, at D1,
col. 1. McDonald's has set a goal of recycling 25% of the one billion pounds of polysty-
rene used each year in food service packaging by 1995.
58. This was generally the approach used with the Sullivan Principles. Some criti-
cized the Sullivan procedures for being too weighted towards aggregate data, for not
allowing anyone but Arthur Little employees to conduct the evaluations, and for having
flawed self-reporting and no employee input. Paul, The Inadequacy of Sullivan Reporting,
57 Bus. & Soc'v REV. 61 (1986).
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